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It takes more than a single opinion to understand how
legal reasoning and personal experience shape a 24-year career
BY RICHARD C. REUBEN
arry Blackmun may have never stepped up to
home plate, shifted his weight in the batters
box and waited to test slugger Ted Williams'
contention that sports' hardest task is to hit a round
ball with a round bat, but he definitely proved that
Williams was wrong.
Williams had failed to consider how hard it could
be for Blackmun to get other justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court to agree on a list of baseball's greatest
players that Blackmun wanted as a tribute to the
sport in an opinion upholding baseball's antitrust
exemption.
Always the baseball fan, Blackmun started with
nearly 70 players. As his draft opinion circulated, one
justice asked to add a curve-ball pitcher with 174
career wins; Blackmun decided that a pitcher with
373 wins was more deserving. Another justice declined to join the opinion unless it included a player
from his hometown team; Blackmun complied. A third
protested the omission of black players; Blackmun
added three.

Finally the Court emerged with a 5-3 opinion in
Flood v. Kuhn, 103 U.S. 258 (1972). For Blackmun,
the victory was more than a sporting triumph that
affirmed a foundation of the professional game and
crafted consensus for an all-time dream team. It was
the harbinger of a 24-year career of traditions and
changes, in which he would affirm established rules
on most criminal issues and accommodate such
dramatic views on individual rights that his reasoning
often carried slim majorities with him.
With his retirement in June after participating in
more than 800 cases-including his career-identifying
7-2 opinion in Roe v. Wade legalizing abortion-the
definition of his tenure lies in the seeming contradiction of commitment and flexibility.
Along with a steadfast defense of the right to
abortion in Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and successive
cases, Blackmun's significance was in the power of his
vote, says Jesse Choper, a constitutional law professor
at the University of California at Berkeley. "For most
of his years on the Court he was one of a bloc of four
liberal justices that, in a great number of highly
important cases, was able to bring in one of the
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conservatives to achieve a liberal result," Choper
says. "The law would be a lot different today if a
conservative had been in Blackmun's seat."
Often overlooked in the public's emphasis on
Roe is an appreciation of Blackmun's reflective,
methodical, if not occasionally pointed, jurisprudence.
"By whatever standards one chooses to measure
a justice-intelligence and modesty, courage and
compassion, hard work and the authorship of great
opinions-Justice Blackmun's legacy should cause
him to be regarded as one of the truly great justices
in American history," maintains Erwin Chemerinsky, a professor at the University of Southern
California Law Center in Los Angeles.
Plainly, Blackmun has picked up his share of
critics, primarily from conservative camps and primarily for Roe. He was recently excoriated in The
New Republic as being an intellectual lightweight
and an overly sentimental agonizer pulled to the left
by clerks and other justices. The characterization,
though, may falter on simplistic vehemence.
Erwin N. Griswold, a former dean of the
Harvard Law School and a former U.S. solicitor
general, insists that Blackmun defies labeling. "He
had a great independence of mind, and if reasoning
his way through the problem led to a liberal or
conservative result, [whatever that result was] was
his decision."
As a justice, Blackmun preferred balancing to
rigid rules, deference to legislative intent rather
than an imperial judiciary, and, perhaps ironically
considering Roe, had a relatively cautious approach
to judicial power.
For his own assessment of his place in the
philosophical spectrum and decisions of the Court,
the 85-year-old Blackmun repeatedly quotes the late
Justice Felix Frankfurter: "I haven't changed; it's
the Court that changed under me" (obliquely pointing to the more conservative justices appointed by
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush). Ironically, when Blackmun arrived on the Court in 1970,
neither supporters nor detractors expected him or
the Court to change much of anything.
He was the nonthreatening third choice of
President Richard Nixon after the Senate -successively rejected the politically motivated nominations
of judges G. Harrold Carswell and Clement F.
Haynesworth Jr. (Tlb this day, Blackmun refers to
himself as "Old Number 3," and sent Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Jr. a note welcoming him to the
club after his confirmation following failed nominations of judges Robert Bork and Douglas
Ginsburg.)
Blackmun was immediately viewed as the
conservative sibling of fellow Minnesotan and chief
justice Warren Burger and given the mildly derisive
(although baseball-oriented) label of "The Minnesota
Twin." During his first year on the Court he joined
Burger in 96 percent of his votes, according to an
analysis by the "Harvard Law Review." During the
first five years he twined with Burger in 84 percent
of votes.
Blackmun was always most at home with the
Court's conservatives on criminal justice issues, the
majority of the Court's docket. A fact-sensitive
justice, he preferred a case-by-case, totality-ofcircumstances approach. He was also a strong
proponent of the harmless error rule as long as it was
not treated as "merely a formula to incant before

affirming the results of constitutionally infirm prosecutions." Wright v. Florida,106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986).

Blackmun tended to defer to legislative intent
in statutory cases defining crimes and their consequences. In constitutional cases, he generally took a
dim view of such judge-made standards as the
exclusionary rule for tainted evidence and the
Miranda warnings on right to silence.
"[There comes] a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot
continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the
pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty
of the executive and legislative branches," he wrote
in United States v.Janis,428 U.S. 433 (1976).
Blackmun contributed to many conservative
victories on substantive criminal issues throughout
his career, including decisions to:
1 Bar defendants from raising Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus proceedings if the
issues had been fully and fairly litigated at the state
trial, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
0, Establish a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in warrantless search cases. United
States v.Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
-Uphold the general constitutionality of the
federal sentencing guidelines (as the case came to
the Court on separation-of-powers grounds). Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
Tb his early detractors-then the liberal ideologues who would later revere him-his predictable
law-and-order votes with Burger and other conservatives made him nothing more than "Hip-Pocket
Harry." Blackmun resented it. "I have a little anger
underneath it all ... from being categorized over the

last 12 years I've been here in a way I never think
fit," Blackmun acknowledged in a 1983
interview with The
New York Times Magazine.
But just as Roe
cannot define a 24year career, neither
can other opinions in
a single area of the
law.
Despite the comfort traditionalists
found in his appearance as a scion of
the Establishment,
Blackmun had a common-man's aversion
to the trappings of
power in official Wash-

ington and worried
about how judicial
opinions would affect
the ordinary people involved in extraordinary cases.

Sis professional development began after he

was graduated summa cum laude in mathematics from Harvard College in 1929, culled
honors from Harvard Law School in 1932, and
clerked with Judge John B. Sanborn on the 8th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
At the Minneapolis firm of Dorsey & Whitney,
Blackmun gained a reputation as a top tax and
estate lawyer, and was a popular lecturer for
continuing legal education courses and an adjunct
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professor of wills, property and tax.
Blackmun became general counsel for the Mayo
Clinic and Mayo Association, and in 1959 President
Dwight Eisenhower appointed him to the 8th Circuit. There he emerged as the court's tax expert and
most studious member.
But what impressed Nixon at the height of
Vietnam War protests in 1970 was Blackmun's
tough stand on crime and social order. His appellate
court opinions rarely disturbed criminal convictions
or sentences, according to an analysis by former 8th
Circuit Chief Judge Donald Lay. In the circuit court
appeal of a conscientious objector to the military
draft, Blackmun scolded that "it may be hard [for
people such as respondent] to grow up these days.
Others, however, seem to manage." United States v.
Cummins, 425 F.2d 646 (1970).
As blunt as he might have been, Blackmun also
placed great emphasis on the factual, legal and social
context of a case. Compassion was another factor in

Supreme Court," recalls former law clerk Al Lauber,
now a tax lawyer at Caplin & Drysdale in Washington, D.C. For Blackmun, Lauber says, it was a
"constant struggle for the right answer in close cases,
particularly those involving important personal
rights."
The evolving Harry Blackmun who struggled
for those answers may be most apparent in the death
penalty debate. Blackmun personally opposed the
death penalty, but enforced it as a judge, believing
"...
we should not allow personal preferences as to the
wisdom of legislative action, or our distaste for such
action, to guide our judicial decision[s]." Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Twenty-two years
later he announced in Callins v.Collins, 114 S. Ct.
1127 (1994), that he could no longer condone the
death sentence. He refused to "tinker with the
machinery of death." This spring he cast the only
vote to review a last-minute appeal by an Illinois
serial killer executed in May.
His evolution from personal to
judicial opposition to the death penalty followed both belief and the
edges of a path in which the Court
did "change under" him.
Blackmun brought with him
an appellate judge's appreciation
for the potential abuse of habeas
corpus, which allows federal review
of state criminal convictions, as a
stalling tactic. In the Burger and
am Brennanf
early Rehnquist Courts he joined
80%
movements to trim the Warren
Court's willingness to allow those
70%
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his judicial equation. On the Supreme Court he often
criticized colleagues for refusing to recognize that
"compassion need not be exiled from the province of
judging." DeShaney v. Winnebago Department of
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
"Because I grew up in poor surroundings," he
once told an interviewer, '"I know there is another
world out there that we sometimes forget about."
Born into a blue-collar family, he worked
part-time for spending money and expenses, including stints as a janitor and a milkman. Even in
Washington he followed his Midwestern commonsense approach to life. He drove an old Volkswagen
(until Court security convinced him otherwise),
rented an apartment in Virginia, and did his own
income tax returns.
His sense of how most people live echoed
throughout his jurisprudence. In 1977 he pleaded
that other justices remember "there is another world
'out there,' a world inhabited by the poor, the
powerless and the oppressed." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977).
"That's how Justice Blackmun lived his life, and
it certainly affected how he looked at cases at the
48 ABA JOURNAL/JULY 1994
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For the cautious, process-oriented Blackmun, habeas corpus was
still a crucial tool for ensuring the
proper administration of the death
penalty in an inexact world. The
more aggressive the Rehnquist Court
became in its assault, the more
Blackmun drifted from the majority.
By 1992 he had moved to a
concurring stand because of his

"ever-growing skepticism" that the
Court's new habeas corpus doctrine assured the
death penalty would be constitutionally administered. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2415 (1992).
Exclaiming that "the execution of a person who can
show that he is innocent comes perilously close to
simple murder," he formally joined the dissent a year
later in Herrerav. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993). By
his final term, he was so dismayed with the Court's
habeas corpus jurisprudence that he abandoned his
support of the death penalty altogether in Callins.
Blackmun's reversal only fueled the anger of his
critics, who by then were more likely to be conservative ideologues. But Texas scholar Wright sees the
change more as an example of Blackmun's openmindedness, intellectual honesty and willingness to
reconsider previously held positions.
"This is a strength in a judge, rather than a
weakness," says Wright. "Most of us don't like to
concede we may have been wrong, and the fact that
a Supreme Court justice is willing to think about
things and say to the world, 'I was wrong,' to me is an
admirable quality."
Similar change was also evident on social
issues. In an early decision Blackmun appeared
CHARTBYJEFFDIONISE PHOTOSBYNATIONAL GEOGRAPHICSOCIETYAND ABAJ/KENHEINEN

insensitive, caustically upholding a $5 filing fee for
indigents seeking bankruptcy protection as "less
than the price of a movie and little more than the cost
of a pack or two of cigarettes." United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973). He was remonstrated by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who wrote, "The desperately
poor ... have more important things to do with what
little money they have-like attempting to provide
some comforts for a gravely ill child. ... "
But Blackmun matured into one of the Court's
most consistent and articulate champions of individual rights, often drawing on the sense of compassion
that was cultivated at the Mayo Clinic.
In contrast to his votes during his first five
years on the Court, during his final five years he
joined the conservative Chief Justice William
Rehnquist in 53 percent of the cases and paired with
the liberal Justice William Brennan in 76 percent.
ut even before a philosophical shift (or change
in the Court itself) that would characterize his
tenure, his identifying moment came in his
third term with Roe v. Wade, which brought together
Blackmun's interests in law and medicine, and
reflected his judicial style and philosophy. Blackmun
did most of the research on the opinion himself,
laboring on it for nearly two years-including work
during the 1972 summer recess at the Mayo Clinicbefore delivering it Jan. 22, 1973, with his wife,
Dorothy, in the audience.
The opinion exhaustively traced the history of
medical knowledge about abortion and the law of
privacy, both of which led Blackmun to conclude the
privacy right, while not specifically identified in the
Constitution, was sufficiently grounded either in the
14th Amendment's concept of liberty or the 9th
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, "to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."
The 54-page decision concluded by recognizing
its own boundaries with characteristic Blackmun
humility: "We need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the
answer."
The decision, of course, thrust Blackmun into
the public spotlight as few judges have been catapulted before or since. He has been hailed by
women's rights activists as a hero and vilified by
anti-abortion activists as a demon.
Former Harvard dean Griswold praises Blackmun for his stoicism in the face of such a protracted
and political outcry over an opinion routinely assigned him.
"He has not complained, reacted or spoken out,
but I know that this has been a heavy burden, which
he has accepted with grace and dignity," Griswold
says.
For Blackmun, the Roe decision concerned more
than abortion.
"It's a step that had to be taken down the road
toward the full emancipation of women," Blackmun
told reporters when asked about it after announcing
his retirement in March.
On the bench, he championed women's rights
across the legal spectrum. He wrote, for example, the
opinion of the Court in a case of enormous symbolic
AP PHOTO

value, holding that employers could not bar women
from higher-paying assembly jobs in lead-battery
factories, even to safeguard maternal health. UAW v.
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
Within the Court, too, Blackmun opened avenues for women as law clerks, hiring more females
than any other justice, including Sandra Day O'Connor. Blackmun knew the importance of female law
clerks was not limited to providing a different
perspective. He also thought it was crucial to
training role models for important positions in the
legal profession, says Sherry F. Colb, a 1992 clerk
who teaches law at Rutgers University in Camden,
N.J.
Blackmun's insistence on equality was not
limited to women. A constant theme of his jurisprudence was protection of the less powerful.
He had little tolerance for racial discrimination,
a point signaled by his vote in several important
decisions during his first term, including one ban-

ning non-job-related employment tests that had
racially discriminatory effects. Griggsv. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Similarly, in affirmative action, he took the
more liberal view in Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), a decision
which, like Roe, was influenced by his regard for
medicine. Citing the scarcity of minority doctors, he
wrote "if ways are not found to remedy that situation
[including medical school admission policies], the
country can never achieve its professed goal of a
society that is not race conscious. ... In order to get
beyond racism, we must first take in account race."
He continued to support most voluntary affirmative-action programs, and strongly dissented when
the Court made them much more difficult for local
governments to sustain, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
As the Rehnquist Court began to stymie judicial
protections for minorities in the late 1980s, Blackmun joined Brennan and Marshall in leading the
dissent. "One wonders whether the majority still
believes that race discrimination ... is a problem in
our society, or remember that it ever was," he wrote
ABA JOURNAL /JULY 1994 49

The Blackmun brief

struck down minority admissions program at a Califomia
state medical school

Key opinions since joining-the Supreme Court June 9,
1970:

Garclav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(Feb. 19, 1985) Wrote for majority holding local governments to minimum wage requiiements.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (June 21, 1971) Wrote for
majority that juveniles did not have criminal defendants'
right to jury trial.

Bowers v. Hardwick (June 30, 1986) Dissented from
holding approving state sodomy laws.

Roe v. Wade (Jan. 22, 1973) Wrote for majority
invalidating criminal penalties for performing abortions
and creating constitutionally protected access to abortion.
Bigelow v. Virginia (June 16, 1975) Wrote for majority
upholding a newspaper's right to publish an advertisement for an organization that atsisted women in
obtaining abortions.
Beal v. Doe (June 20, 1977) Dissented from holding
that Medicaid program did not require states to pay for
low-income women's abortions.
Bates v. Arizona (June 27, 1977) Wrote for majority
striking down state legal ethics codes barring lawyer
advertising.
Regents of the University ofI California v. Bakke
(June 28, 1978) Dissented in part from holding that

DeShaney v. Winnebago County (Feb. 22, 1989)
Dissented from holding that public welfare officials did
not have constitutional obligation to protect a child
against parental abuse.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (July 3,
1909) Dissented from holding allowing state abortion
restrictions.
Allegheny County v, ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter JJuly 3, 1989) Wrote for majority that a predominantly religious Christmas display could not be
placed on government property.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey (June 29, 1992) Concurred in reaffirming a constitutional right to abortion.
Callins v. Collins (Feb. 22, 1994) Dissented from a
death penalty decision, wrting I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simplyto concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed."

in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 Marshall in 1990, Blackmun came to be viewed as the
(1989).
Court's most liberal justice. Many have attributed his
He wrote most passionately when coming to the evolution to Brennan's influence and Blackmun's
aid of society's least popular or empowered, including longevity on a Court reshaped by a series of conservahis concerns for children, teen-age girls and homo- tive appointments and its subsequent style of conservasexuals:
tism.
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Indeed, by that time, Blackmun
and cruel irony to those children
trapped in violent families." Ohio v.
could empathize as Kennedy abAkron Center for Reproductive
sorbed the predictable assault from
Health. 497 U.S. 502 (19901
abortion opponents for failing to cast
10"Depriving individuals of the right to choose for the deciding vote in Casey to reverse Roe. When critics
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships accused Kennedy of being "Blackrnunized," the senior
poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply justice wrote him a note confiding "don't worry, it's not
rooted in our nation's history than tolerance of fatal."
nonconformity could ever do." Bowvers v.Hardwick,
For Justice Harry Blackmun, it was always just
478 U.S. 166 (1986).
part of the commitment and flexibility in 24 years on
After the retirements of Brennan in 1989 and the Court.
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